I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution does not define the word "person."
1 More specifically, it does not clearly delineate who or what is included in the concept of "person" for purposes of bestowing the rights and protections that are found in the document. 2 Nor does the Constitution tell us when life begins. 3 Some may argue that defining "personhood" or "life" is best left to philosophers and theologians, but regardless of the philosophical or religious nature of these questions, the answers have profound implications for the law. While there is certainly more to be said on these topics, the point of this project is to explore the implications of adopting a certain "thin," biological conception of life and personhood as it relates to the potential for legal restrictions on reproductive choice. 5 Interestingly, in the Supreme Court's most recent abortion decision, it went as far as to say that "by common understanding and scientific terminology, a fetus is a living organism while within the 576 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 39 NO. 4 2013 outlaw or restrict access to all types of contraception, 14 it is far less clear whether access to certain types of birth control could be restricted. 15 This would be particularly true if a personhood framework passes, given that birth control's mechanism of operation is effective after fertilization has taken place. The interest in protecting the rights of these newly recognized persons could lead to restrictions on any form of contraception that is or could be effective after fertilization has occurred. Further, the Supreme Court has yet to suggest that any fundamental right to procreate includes a right to have access to infertility treatments. 16 Defining fertilized ova to be persons entitled to legal protection would seem to establish a strong interest in restricting treatments that put these persons at risk of injury or death.
This lack of clarity regarding how a personhood framework might impact reproductive choice outside the abortion context has contributed to the failure of personhood measures in multiple states, and could be the reason why the federal Sanctity of Human Life Act, which was co-sponsored by Congressman and former vice-presidential candidate Paul Ryan, did not make it out of congressional committee when first proposed in 2011. 17 While it may not have been surprising that personhood initiatives would be soundly defeated in a state such as Colorado, 18 the late 2011 failure of a proposed personhood amendment to the Mississippi Constitution sparked drastic changes to the language utilized within the Personhood Movement. 19 The revised language targets questions raised by previous iterations, but it does not dispel the most pressing concerns regarding reproductive choice. And while no state has adopted a personhood framework yet, at least nine states can expect to see personhood measures in coming years. 20 As of March 2013, the North Dakota Senate and House approved an initiative (which will now appear on the November 2014 ballot) to amend the state constitution to protect "the inalienable right to life of every human being at any stage of development." 21 How we define "person," or at what point rights attach to human life, will directly impact all things surrounding the reproductive process, regardless of the intent with which that process begins. It is true that such answers will affect the choices available to women once pregnant, but they will also inevitably impact such things as the availability of certain birth control options, and the permissiveness of various forms of assisted reproductive technologies (ART).
The purpose of this article is to show why the revisions found in new personhood proposals at the state level 22 do not adequately address the concerns raised regarding potential implications for reproductive choice. If a personhood framework is adopted, it is likely that restrictions on certain birth control methods and ART would soon follow. In a future article I will argue that, given the uncertainty regarding the nature and scope of any procreational liberty protected by the Constitution, it is very possible that such restrictions would be upheld. 23 In short, regardless of the implications for abortion, certain forms of contraception and infertility treatments are particularly susceptible to successful restriction in the event that a personhood framework is adopted through legislation or state constitutional amendment. 24 To that end, Part II of the present article will provide a brief background of the Personhood Movement, including the unexpected failure of the proposed amendment to the Mississippi Constitution. Part III will explore the nature of the debates in Mississippi to provide context for debates likely to be held elsewhere, and will also introduce revisions made within the Personhood Movement to the language of future proposals in response to the failure in Mississippi. Part IV will then discuss how an understanding of the relevant biology and physiology of the reproductive process including contraception and IVF demonstrates why the new language being proposed within the Personhood Movement should not prove satisfying for those concerned about the potential for significant restrictions on reproductive choice. This is not to say that all such reproductive choices would be banned outright, but Part IV will also offer examples of what those restrictions might look 20 Since the Supreme Court acknowledged a woman's fundamental right to choose to terminate her pregnancy forty years ago, 25 abortion opponents have been struggling to limit women's ability to exercise that right. Over these decades, the Court has heard dozens of cases addressing the constitutionality of various restrictions on abortion. 26 While Casey undoubtedly made it easier for states to impose such restrictions, 27 nothing short of an absolute prohibition on abortion will appease the staunchest opponents. Acknowledging the "personhood" of the preborn is thought to be an avenue toward establishing a framework that would achieve this goal without direct reference to abortion. 33 While statutes or state constitutional amendments that define personhood may not be effective themselves in outlawing abortion, the hope is that a challenge to any such statute or amendment would make its way to the Supreme Court, giving the Court an opportunity to overturn its prior decisions regarding abortion.
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The increased wave of attempts by states in the last five years 35 to establish a personhood framework through statute or constitutional amendment can fairly be attributed to the work of Kristi Burton. 36 In 2008, Ms. Burton worked with Colorado for Equal Rights to qualify a voter initiative that proposed an amendment (Amendment 48) to the Colorado Constitution. 37 The text of this initiative, and that of more recent personhood measures, 38 does not mention abortion, nor does it include the subordinating language found in Missouri's preamble. Constitution." Borgmann, Meaning of Life, supra note 4, at 576 n.118. In other words, personhood initiatives themselves would not necessarily outlaw abortion. Unless Roe is overturned, the Court would have to consider the extent to which recognition of preborn "personhood" restricts Roe's acknowledgment of women's constitutional right to choose to have an abortion. See also Carter, supra note 28, at 307 (discussing the appropriateness of using the democratic process to resolve the abortion debate, and citing In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d 1, 11 (Okla. 1992) for the proposition that the initiative process "was never intended to be a vehicle for amending the United States Constitution nor can it serve that function in our system of government"). 33 What is Personhood, supra note 29 (stating that "to be a person is to be protected by a series of God-given rights and constitutional guarantees such as life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. This terrifies the pro-abortion foes! They know that if we clearly define the preborn baby as a person, they will have the same right to life as all Americans do."). 34 The 38 See supra note 19; see infra Appendix I. This discussion is focused on efforts by states to avoid specifically mentioning abortion by defining the term "person" to include the preborn through statute or constitutional amendment. 39 For the relevant text of Missouri's preamble, see supra note 35.
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Specifically, proposed Amendment 48 sought to add a new section to the Colorado Constitution that would have simply read "Section 31. Person defined. As used in sections 3, 6, and 25 of article II of the state constitution, the terms 'person' or 'persons' shall include any human being from the moment of fertilization." 40 Although seventy-three percent of the Colorado electorate voted against this proposal, the day after the vote, Keith Mason founded Personhood USA to continue the effort. 41 Personhood USA is a national organization with many regional affiliates 42 that identifies itself as a non-profit Christian ministry that "serves the pro-life community by assisting local groups to initiate citizen, legislative, and political action focusing on the ultimate goal of the pro-life movement: personhood rights for all innocent humans." 43 Among other things, the organization is committed to "moving churches and the culture to make the dehumanization and murdering of preborn children unthinkable." 44 Some have suggested that the Personhood Movement is simply about returning to first principles, 45 and Personhood USA itself is very specific: the movement is about "working to respect the God-given right to life recognizing all human beings as persons who are 'created in the image of God' from the beginning of their biological development, without exceptions." 46 This language expressly adopts a thin, biological definition of life and personhood, 47 and there is nothing on its face limiting its applicability to abortion.
Although the position is subject to challenge as being inappropriately speciesest, proponents maintain that the only criterion relevant to assigning the protections associated with legal personhood is membership in the Homo sapiens species. 48 After all, under the revised language every human being is a "person," and human beings include "every member of the species [H]omo sapiens at any stage of development." 49 The Sanctity of Human Life Act similarly states that "human being" includes "every member of the species [H]omo sapiens at all stages of life." 50 Further, proponents are clear that for them membership in the species begins at the outset of biological development.
51
This approach stands in contrast to other ways in which we might define legal or moral personhood. For instance, one might agree with the human species concept, yet maintain that membership does not occur until a later time in development, such as the appearance of the primitive streak around fourteen days after fertilization, 52 or when other evidence of "life" is present like a detectable heartbeat (five to six weeks) 53 or electrical activity in the early brain (eight weeks). 54 One could also assign legal or moral personhood to a pre-embryo 55 not because of its current state, but because it has the potential to develop into a born human being. 56 Yet another approach rejects the significance of membership in the Homo sapiens species, and instead would attach legal or moral personhood at the point when the developing organism attains certain capacities, such as the capacity to experience pain 57 or for rational thought or self-consciousness. 58 Interestingly, one could try to identify fetal viability as the person-defining criterion using any of these approaches. For instance, membership in the species could be deemed to begin at viability; or a fetus mi ght be considered to have sufficient potential of becoming a born human at the point of viability such that it is then worthy of legal protection; or, as the Supreme Court noted in Roe, one could say that at viability the fetus has the capacity for 51 See infra notes 173-189 and accompanying text (discussing the biology of early human development). The argument generally raised in support of this position is that once the egg and sperm have united, a unique genetic human being exists. CYNTHIA B. COHEN, RENEWING THE In an interesting article, Jessica Berg outlines a different kind of personhood framework 60 where she suggests that a claim to the protections of legal personhood in the context of the non-sentient (those without interests or consciousness) must be based not on the entity's own interests (since it has none), but on the protection of interests of others. 61 She further argues that legal protection of the non-sentient may be more limited than that afforded to persons with interests.
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By way of example, Professor Berg points out that at birth, the law currently protects the life of even non-sentient human beings, such as an anencephalic infant who lacks the cortical structures necessary for consciousness, not because the anencephalic infant herself has a claim to protection of her own interests, but "because there is a societal interest in encouraging specific caring behaviors towards all infants (and discouraging other behaviors such as infanticide)." 63 This is important since, at least in part, the suggestion could be made that because anencephalic infants appear very much like newborn babies with normal cortical function, a societal interest exists in protecting them as legal persons notwithstanding their lack of their own interests. 64 Another example can be seen in Gonzales v. Carhart, where the Court references Congress' statement that permitting partial-birth abortions in the second trimester (at which point the fetus has recognizably human features) would "further coarsen society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable and innocent human life, making it increasingly difficult to protect such life." 65 But the same would arguably not be true for the entity existing very early in biological development (say a single-celled zygote, which does not appear to share many characteristics with a newborn person), and this may suggest that the interests of others would not be sufficient at this earlier stage to protect this non-sentient entity as a legal person. 66 But those in support of the Personhood Movement would counter that society has a sufficient interest in acknowledging the value of and offering protection to all members of the Homo sapiens species without regard to sentience. In fact, the devaluing of what is considered to be human life (by not protecting it) is considered by personhood proponents to be a great detriment to societal interests. 67 How early in the developmental process the Court would acknowledge such a societal or stateasserted interest is unclear. But in this regard, it is interesting to note that the Personhood Movement appears (even if inadvertently) to be taking Justice Rehnquist up on his suggestion in Cruzan (in the end-of-life context) that States "may properly decline to make judgments about the 'quality' of life that a particular person may enjoy and may simply assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human 59 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) . 60 Berg, supra note 1, at 375-79. 61 Id. at 376; cf. DWORKIN, supra note 48, at 11-13 (describing the "detached objection to abortion," which is a claim against abortion based on the belief that human life has intrinsic value regardless of whether the human has its own interests).
62 Berg, supra note 1, at 376. It is on this point that Personhood proponents would surely disagree. 63 The Personhood Movement, at its core, is about adopting a "thin," unqualified, and biological definition of personhood that would attach full moral status and legal protection to the life of the preborn and place them on equal footing with the born, 70 and in 2010 Personhood USA successfully placed another citizen-driven constitutional amendment on the ballot in Colorado. 71 The language the second time around was slightly different. 72 The 2010 version was intended to apply to the same constitutional provisions, but this time the proposed amendment stated that the terms "person" or "persons" shall apply "to every human being from the beginning of the biological development of that human being." 73 Here the term fertilization was removed, and the stated reason for this change was to broaden the scope to make sure that the provision included any persons created through asexual reproduction, like cloning. 74 As occurred in 2008, 75 opponents of the 2010 measure raised concerns that the proposal would have impacts on contraception, fertility treatments, and the medical treatment of pregnant women. 76 These concerns were publicly labeled as scare tactics by Personhood USA, 77 but although the language of the initiative was different, the result was the same, with the Colorado electorate voting against the 2010 proposed amendment by a margin of three to one. 78 After resounding defeats in Colorado, 79 Personhood USA directed its efforts at arguably 77 Jorgenson, supra note 37. 78 Id. Interestingly, far less money was raised in campaign efforts the second time aroun d. In 2008, supporters of Amendment 48 raised over $350,000, while opponents raised in excess of $1.8 million, but in 2010 those numbers were down to around $50,000 and $578,000, respectively. Id.; Draper, supra note 75. 79 In 2010 an Alaskan citizen proposed an amendment to existing state legislation that sought to "protect the natural right to life and body of all mankind from the beginning of biological development," and stated that "the natural right to life and body of the unborn child supercedes [sic] the statutory right of the mother to consent to the injury or death of her unborn child. " Alaska Natural Right to Life Initiative (2011) For its part, Personhood USA performed exit polling in an attempt to discover what caused the unanticipated defeat in Mississippi. 100 The poll suggested that the amendment's failure could not be attributed to a large group of previouslyunidentified abortion-rights voters in Mississippi; rather, only 8% of the ten thousand people polled indicated that they voted against the measure because they identify themselves as "pro-choice."
101 A greater percentage (12%) said that they voted against Measure 26 because then-Governor Haley Barbour expressed concerns about it.
102 But the two most common reasons indicated for voting against the initiative had to do with potential implications for (a) the medical treatment of pregnant women (28%), and (b) the availability of IVF (31%).
103
When reporting the results of this polling, Personhood USA noted that proponents of Measure 26 had repeatedly said that "the amendment could not ban in vitro fertilization, contraception, or healthcare for women," but that "Planned Parenthood (under the guise of Mississippians for Healthy Families), persisted in lying to Mississippi voters, propagating scare tactics that were proven false numerous times. In response to Planned Parenthood's perceived lies, Personhood USA drastically revised the language to be used in future personhood efforts. 106 In Mason's own words, the "new personhood language prevents those falsehoods by making it absolutely clear what the amendment can and cannot do-while still protecting every child from his or her earliest stages."
107 In order to fully appreciate the revisions made, 108 and how "absolutely clear" 109 they really are, it is first necessary to understand the nature of the debates in Mississippi to provide context to the broader debates concerning personhood. As it turns out, not all of the proponents of Measure 26 were consistent in what they believed the amendment could and could not (or should and should not) do. The immediate legal impact that Measure 26 would (or could) have had was never clear, in part because the language of the amendment was silent in this regard.
111 For instance, it is possible that as soon as the amendment became effective, thousands of references in the Mississippi Code to "person" or "persons," including in homicide statutes, would have needed to be understood to include every human being from the moment of fertilization, cloning, or the functional equiva lent thereof. In such a case, Measure 26 would have been effectively self-executing, since no enabling legislation would have been needed to set it in motion.
112 Abortion becomes immediately problematic, because the existing statutory framework includes laws criminalizing the intentional killing of persons. Indeed, any loss of life 105 of these newly recognized persons could be investigated and prosecuted using the existing statutory framework.
113
On the other hand, it is also possible that the amendment would have been interpreted to require enabling legislation to set it in motion, in which case, the amendment itself would have had no immediate impact (on abortion or otherwise). 114 Under this scenario, after passage, discussions would have been held regarding what the enabling legislation should look like, and certainly an antiabortion statute would have been expected. 115 But supporters of Measure 26 did not express consistent positions regarding whether the amendment was intended to be effectively self-executing. 116 For instance, some proponents of the amendment suggested that Measure 26 merely set forth constitutional principles, and that it would need enabling legislation.
117 At a symposium hosted by Mississippi College School of Law that I helped to organize in advance of the November election, the General Counsel of Liberty Counsel, which defended Measure 26 in legal challenges in Mississippi courts, suggested that the proposed amendment would require enabling legislation to be effective; however, at the same symposium, a national spokeswoman for Personhood USA indicated that she believed that after the amendment became effective, local prosecutors would immediately be permitted to decide whether to conduct investigations involving the loss of life of these newly recognized persons.
118
As Professor Borgmann pointed out, many supporters of Measure 26, who thought they were voting on an abortion ban, may have been surprised if the amendment passed and yet had no immediate impact. 119 And because Measure 26 failed, the Mississippi Supreme Court never had to address the question of whether, under state law, the amendment would have been effectively self-executing. In response to the uncertainty raised in Mississippi on this issue, the revised personhood language that was proposed in Colorado and elsewhere explicitly states that "all provisions [of the amendment] are self-executing and are severable." 120 The significance of this position should not be lost. With no need for legislation to be enacted, these proponents seem to be suggesting that no discussion need be had 113 by elected officials regarding the nature and scope of the amendment. Rather than subsequent political discussion defining the impact of the amendment on such things as abortion, the treatment of pregnant women, contraception or IVF, the amendment itself would dictate that the existing statutory framework is capable of dealing with these issues taking into account the new definition of the term "person." 121 Just as abortion would immediately become problematic, so too would the treatment of pregnant women, contraception, and IVF that involve the death of newly recognized persons. The existing statutory framework would treat these deaths just like any other loss of human life.
That said, the amendment's identifying itself as self-executing would not likely end the inquiry. When this revised language was recently introduced in Arkansas, the attorney general noted in his opinion rejecting the proposal that, given the changes that would be needed to the Arkansas Code if the proposal were to pass, the amendment could not be self-executing. 122 Whether a given personhood amendment could be self-executing is a matter of individual state law 123 an exploration of which is beyond the scope of this article. The revised language, however, makes clear that certain proponents have officially taken the position that they intend these amendments to have an immediate impact should they pass without further political discourse.
A different approach was taken recently in North Dakota. There, the State Senate approved a personhood initiative to amend the state constitution to add a very short statement protecting human life at any stage of development; 124 however, a piece of enabling legislation (S.B. 2302) dealing with such things as birth control and IVF was simultaneously proposed in the Senate to take effect if the constitutional amendment is approved by the citizens of North Dakota. 125 While S.B. 2302 was struck down by the Senate, since the constitutional initiative was approved by the House, it will appear on the ballot in 2014. 126 And if the constitutional amendment passes, the North Dakota legislature is likely to revisit the implications for birth control and IVF. 127 But if adoption of a personhood amendment is intended to have an immediate impact on the existing statutory framework without the need for enabling legislation, as it could in some states, what would that mean for the treatment of pregnant women, contraception, and IVF (question two from above)? Part IV of this article will focus on implications for reproductive choice, including contraception and IVF, but a few words on the treatment of pregnant women and miscarriages are in order. 121 Further, certain existing laws pertaining to the preborn would become redundant at best, or unconstitutional at worst. There would be no need for specific feticide statutes, because fetuses would be treated no differently (save for proposed exceptions in the personhood amendment itself) than any other person. In fact, to treat the death of a fetus differently could raise equal protection issues under the Fourteenth Amendment, just as it would if we treated the death of toddlers differently than that of teenagers or adults. It would seem to be a violation of the equal protection of the toddler if the law were written to say that the unintentional killing of a toddler is not prohibited, or that the killing of a toddler is punishable by a maximum of only two years in p rison. This is not to say that the Court would be precluded from determining that a fetus is sufficiently different than a born person so as to permit different treatment. 
B. TREATMENT OF PREGNANT WOMEN AND MISCARRIAGES
With regard to treating pregnant women, the question pertains to whether recognizing fertilized ova (however fertilization is to be defined) 128 as having the same legal status as pregnant women restricts the treatment options available for pregnant women. The most common concern raised in the media in particular by physicians involved the treatment of women with ectopic or molar pregnancies, which can prove life-threatening for pregnant women, and necessarily requires termination of the pregnancies. 129 homicide would arguably have been available to defend physicians treating pregnant women in these circumstances. 136 The United States Supreme Court has also referenced the principle of double effect when considering situations in which death occurs as a foreseen though unintended consequence of otherwise permissible activity.
137 "Out of an abundance of caution," however, Liberty Counsel suggested in a legal memorandum pertaining to Measure 26, that it would be "in favor of enabling legislation explicitly providing immunity to medical professionals who unintentionally caused the injury or death to the unborn child during treatment of the mother for an ectopic pregnancy or other life-threatening situations, as well as those 128 See infra Part IV. 129 See Rob Mank, Doctors Call Mississippi "Personhood" Initiative Dangerous, CBS NEWS, Nov. 4, 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-57318625-503544/doctors-call-mississippipersonhood-initiative-dangerous/ (discussing ectopic pregnancies (those where implantation occurs outside the uterus), and molar pregnancies (where the fertilized egg becomes an abnormal growth instead of a fetus), each of which will not lead to successful pregnancies, but can cause the woman to bleed to death or suffer other "dire consequences"). 130 Of course, if the personhood amendments now being proposed are selfexecuting, then no enabling legislation is needed. Since this means that the scope of, or exceptions to, the amendment would not need to be delineated by subsequent legislation, as a matter of immediacy, any limitations on the language should be included in the amendment itself. After the failure of Measure 26 then, Personhood USA went ahead and revised the language to include certain exceptions. 139 Specifically, the new language states that while "the intentional 140 killing of any innocent person is prohibited . . . medical treatment for life threatening physical conditions intended to preserve life shall not be affected by this section," where such medical treatment includes, but is not limited to, "treatment for cancer, ectopic and molar pregnancy, twin-to-twin transfusion syndrome, and placenta previa."
141 "Lifethreatening" is not defined in these revisions, 142 which creates lingering questions. For instance, it is unclear whether termination of a pregnancy would be permissible if a woman with cancer could potentially survive without chemotherapy until the fetus became viable (followed by a Caesarian section, as suggested by Jennifer Mason). 143 For purposes here, it is sufficient to note that personhood proponents have at least attempted to add some immediate protection for physicians treating pregnant women given that the amendment is intended to have an instant impact if passed.
144
It is also worth mentioning the concerns identified regarding women experiencing miscarriages. Under a personhood framework a miscarriage results in the death of a person, and normally, loss of human life is followed by an investigation into the cause, regardless of whether charges ultimately get filed. 145 Personhood proponents identified these concerns as the further use of scare tactics, and Dr. Freda Bush suggested that police would not have time for such "witch hunts."
146 Personhood USA's poll did not indicate that investigation of miscarriages was a prominent reason for the defeat of Measure 26, 147 but nevertheless, the new personhood language includes the statement that "spontaneous miscarriages shall not 138 Memorandum from Liberty Counsel, supra note 117, at 5. For more on IVF see infra Parts III and IV. 139 See infra Appendix I. 140 Intent is not defined. It may be that the amendment itself solely implicates situations where there is a "determination" to kill (specific intent), but in the criminal context in particular, general intent can take "the form of recklessness (involving actual awareness of a risk and the culpable taking of that risk) or negligence (involving blameworthy inadvertence)." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 881-82 (9th ed. 2009). This is important given our awareness of the risks associated with taking certain forms of birth control or undertaking certain procedures in IVF. See infra Part IV. Even if the amendment itself is considered not to immediately impact certain activities or circumstances (due to a lack of specific intent) it at least creates a framework in which subsequent restrictions could be enacted by proponents wishing to remain consistent with the personhood position. be affected by this section," where "spontaneous miscarriage" is defined as "the unintentional termination of a pregnancy."
148
Because miscarriage is here defined in terms of pregnancy, the revision may reflect the common understanding that naturally-occurring fertilization is generally undetectable until the implantation process is complete, which is commonly considered to mark the onset of pregnancy. 149 This may suggest that there should be no investigation into the greater than fifty percent of fertilized ova that are naturally expelled from a woman prior to implantation, 150 notwithstanding the fact that under a personhood framework, a human life has been lost.
But beyond this, the revision does not address the normative problem, which is whether under a personhood framework, women known to be pregnant who experience miscarriages would (or ought) be investigated in connection with that loss of human life. After all, how would the intent with which the pregnancy was terminated be determined save for an investigation? A pregnant woman may look forward to parenthood, but may continue to take narcotics during pregnancy because she is addicted. Any miscarriage would appear to be unintentional (at least lacking specific intent), and perhaps spontaneous under the revised language. Or she may specifically intend that the drug use will lead to the termination of her pregnancy. Even if the authorities, after inquiry, plan to take her word regarding intent, an investigation would seem quite necessary. Importantly, whether such investigation would lead to a prosecution is a separate, but related question.
The issue of drug use during pregnancy raises another problem with the revised language that I will identify here but leave for others to address. Imagine a situation where a state has a statute that permits a woman to be prosecuted and sent to prison for twenty years if she has a miscarriage (even if unintentional) caused by drug use.
151 Or consider Rennie Gibbs who, without regard to any personhood amendment, was charged in 2011 with depraved-heart murder in Mississippi 152 when she experienced a stillbirth at thirty-six weeks gestation, and it was discovered that she had a cocaine habit. 153 If these miscarriages were determined to be unintentional, would such prosecutions be permissible if a state constitutional provision provided that any unintentional termination of pregnancy is not prohibited by the amendment itself?
It is unlikely that a drug-induced miscarriage would be considered acceptable by personhood proponents under the revised personhood language regardless of whether the woman intended for the pregnancy to terminate. 154 In response to 148 Perhaps then, Personhood USA intends that while the amendments themselves may not be considered to prohibit unintentional miscarriages, existing statutes are available to prosecute women experiencing them. 157 If that is the case, then the revised language addresses none of the issues raised in the Mississippi debates. It is unexceptional that personhood proponents would not condone drug use by pregnant women, but what other activities should be considered problematic? If a physician tells a woman to refrain from certain activities while pregnant, but she engages in them anyway and experiences a miscarriage (regardless of intent), would those women be subject to investigation or prosecution under the existing statutory framework? If proponents are committed to the protection of the unborn, it is unclear why they would consider such investigations to be "witch hunts." The revised personhood language does not appear to provide any protection in this regard, and raising the possibility of investigation into miscarriages may not be fear mongering or the use of scare tactics after all.
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTRACEPTION AND/OR IN VITRO FERTILIZATION?
In the weeks leading up to the vote in Mississippi, a great deal of attention (and  confusion) 158 surrounded what impact, if any, Measure 26 would have on contraception and/or IVF. 159 Personhood opponents suggested that the amendment would outlaw contraception and IVF, while proponents fired back that anyone raising these concerns was simply engaging in fear mongering or the use of scare tactics. 160 Neither claim was entirely accurate. With no certainty regarding the immediate impact of Measure 26 were it to have passed, assertions that the amendment would definitely outlaw contraception or IVF were not correct. Similarly, given the inconsistent statements made within the Personhood Movement mothers.html?pagewanted=all (noting the relationship between chemical endangerment laws (like seen in Alabama that are used to prosecute pregnant drug users) and the Personhood Movement). The trend of criminally prosecuting pregnant women in similar circumstances is growing. See Pilkington, supra note 153. For a general discussion of the rise of criminal and civil statut es regarding harm caused to the preborn, see Brown, supra note 5, at 90-97. 155 Pilkington, supra note 153. 156 Id. 157 In a recent interview Keith Mason maintained that claims made about miscarriages by opponents are ridiculous, but went on to note that "I know of cases where a woman that is addicted to crack will have her baby and the state will take the crack baby away because of child abuse and mandate the woman receive treatment-I'm good with that." Pesta, supra note 41. 158 See Borgmann, supra note 117, at 117 n.13. 159 For a discussion of the potential implications for contraception and IVF, s ee, e.g., Grady, supra note 131; Will, Measure 26, supra note 81. 160 See, e.g., Borgmann, supra note 117, at 117; Mandi D. Campbell, Reviving a Culture of Life in America, 6 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 283, 296 (2012) (stating that "in past personhood debates, proabortion groups and individuals told people that the personhood amendments would make birth control and in-vitro fertilization illegal and engaged in other fear-mongering tactics that scared people away from choosing life"); Will, Measure 26, supra note 81, at 64. regarding contraception and IVF, 161 it was disingenuous for proponents of the amendment to claim that raising these concerns was simply resorting to scare tactics.
With respect to those proponents claiming that Measure 26 would need enabling legislation, it was technically truthful, though perhaps misleading, for them to say that the amendment itself would not outlaw contraception or IVF. 162 Misleading, because if the amendment passed, it would leave open the possibility that the subsequent enabling legislation would do just that. In fact, different proponents appeared to have different views about the potential and intended impact of the amendment on things like contraception and IVF. 163 It was clear that abortifacients like RU-486 that cause the embryo or fetus to detach from the uterine wall and then be expelled from the body 164 would be problematic, as would emergency contraception (such as Plan B, the "morning after pill") 165 or intrauterine devices (IUDs) that are thought to prevent implantation of a fertilized egg, but views considering standard hormonal contraceptives became more opaque. 166 Likewise, while proponents consistently maintained that unused preembryos from an IVF cycle could not be discarded or destroyed, they were less transparent about their intent regarding specific aspects of the IVF process that create risk of harm to pre-embryos, like cryopreservation and the transfer process itself. 167 Some personhood proponents will openly express discomfort with current IVF practices, 168 but a Mississippi attorney and "Yes on 26" spokesman was adamant in his view that Measure 26 would not outlaw (or presumably significantly restrict) IVF. 169 He publicly discussed his own two children conceived with the assistance of IVF, and stated that IVF would not be banned by the measure.
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The revised personhood language attempts to put these issues to rest with two seemingly straightforward provisions. While "the intentional killing of any innocent person is prohibited," (1) "only birth control that kills a person" and (2) "only in vitro fertilization and assisted reproduction that kills a person" are affected by the section. 171 The remainder of this paper now turns to whether the concerns raised regarding contraception and IVF were legitimate (or just fear mongering), and whether the revised language used within the Personhood Movement addresses them. 161 166 See, e.g., Grady, supra note 131. 167 Id. 168 In a recent interview, Keith Mason acknowledged that the Personhood Movement seeks to regulate reproductive technology, noting that the Movement "has exposed some of the dark secrets of the IVF industry." John Keilman & Melissa Jenco, 'Personhood' Becomes Ground for Debate in Naperville, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 5, 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-04-05/news/ct-metnaperville-fertilty-clinic-follo-20120405_1_ralph-kazer-ivf-fertilization. 169 Carmon, supra note 161. 170 Id. 171 See infra Appendix I.
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Recall that Measure 26 defined "person" with reference to fertilization, cloning, or the functional equivalent thereof. 172 Under the revised language the term is defined to apply "to every human being regardless of the method of creation," where "human being" means "a member of the species [H]omo sapiens at any stage of development." 173 This change was likely a response to those who pointed out that the use of "fertilization" in Measure 26 was ambiguous, because it could refer to several different moments in the early reproductive process ranging from when the sperm penetrates the egg to successful implantation, which occurs as much as two weeks later. 174 Personhood USA is clear that it intends the rights and privileges associated with personhood to attach as early as possible in the reproductive process. On its website, instead of a reference to successful implantation, you find "[the zygote] formed by the union of an oocyte [egg] and a sperm [as] the beginning of the new human being."
175 That said, "union of egg and sperm" is not the language used in the revised amendments; nor should it be for at least two reasons. First, we now know that the union of the genetic material in the egg and sperm itself is a process taking some 48-72 hours to complete. 176 Within this time period, the sperm penetrates the egg, the maternal and paternal genetic material aligns, and then the new genome activates. 177 Using the phrase "any stage of development" is presumably an attempt to select the earliest possible moment without the need to distinguish among these developmental landmarks. Indeed, some have argued that human development begins "when the egg and sperm have met." 178 Second, the revised language continues to allow cloned human beings to be included in the definition of "person,"
179 since the creation of a clone does not involve the union of an egg and sperm. 180 It is worth noting, though I will not belabor here, that the lack of reference to biological landmarks should not prove satisfying for those who believe that these 172 2013) (declaring that the right to life guaranteed by the Constitution begins with "fertilization, cloning, or its functional equivalent," where fertilization is further defined to mean "the process of human spermatozoan penetrating the cell membrane of a human oocyte to create a human zygote, a one-celled human embryo, which is a new unique human being"). While this definition does not reference our more nuanced understanding of reproductive physiology, by attaching personhood prior to the first cellular cleavage, it would plac e the persondefining moment within the first twenty-four hours after the sperm penetrates the egg. Peters, supra note 174, at 210 n.36. 179 See supra Part II. 180 The process of cloning, or somatic cell nuclear transfer, involves removing the nucleus of an egg cell, replacing it with the genetic material of an adult cell, and then stimulating the re -nucleated cells to divide. Elizabeth Price Foley, Human Cloning and the Right to Reproduce, 65 ALB. L. REV. 625, 626 (2002). distinctions are meaningful. Even if the rights and privileges associated with legal personhood are meant to attach at the very beginning of biological life as opposed to using some "thicker" conception of life 181 we ought to be clear about when this "thin" notion of biological life actually begins. Importantly, personhood proponents are attempting to avoid the slippery slope involved in discussions about "potential life," and when there is sufficient "potential" to be worthy of constitutional protection. 182 But it is not clear from the revised language when development of a living member of the Homo sapiens species begins, 183 and it would not seem appropriate to accord full constitutional protection to non-living members.
For example, until genomic activation occurs, the pre-embryonic genome is dormant, as it lacks its own mitochondrial DNA (the cellular engine) to drive development. 184 One could argue that until the genome has its own power source (via genomic activation the timing of which is still not well understood), we do not have a living member of the Homo sapiens species.
185 Genomic activation could occur as late as the 100-cell stage (which would be several days after either the sperm penetrates the egg or re-nucleation).
186 Therefore, making this distinction would have drastic impacts on the permissibility of certain activities within the IVF process, since no life would be lost unless occurring after genomic activation. 187 In addition, for those who find meaning in the concept of individual genetic identity (numeric or otherwise) as it relates to defining members of the Homo sapiens species, further discussion could be had regarding genomic alignment, cell differentiation, and/or the process of twinning.
188
But for purposes here it will be assumed that the revised language intends for the rights and privileges of personhood to attach very shortly after the sperm penetrates the egg (or the egg is re-nucleated in the context of cloning); that is, within the first twenty-four hours, and prior to the first cellular cleavage.
189 This is significant because the earlier in the reproductive process that rights attach, the greater the implications for reproductive choice.
A. PERSONHOOD AND CONTRACEPTION
The concern raised in regard to prior iterations of personhood measures was that birth control methods that are effective in preventing successful pregnancy after the sperm has penetrated the egg could be problematic, since "such birth control 181 See supra notes 2, 41- 189 Peters, supra note 174, at 205-212. Arguably, the process of development begins as soon as the sperm attaches to the egg, since structural changes occur to both the sperm and egg to allow penetration and subsequent genomic alignment. Id. The Catholic Church appears to have settled on the fusion of the male and female gametes as the beginning of human life, which occurs many hours after the sperm penetrates the egg. Id. at 225. In the context of cloning, clinicians would have to stimulate the re-nucleated cell to initiate cellular division, whereas this process begins naturally when the sperm penetrates the egg. 191 On the other hand, personhood proponents openly condemned IUDs, emergency contraception, and RU-486, since each of these are thought to be effective after the sperm has penetrated the egg, either by preventing successful implantation of the fertilized ovum, or by causing the pregnancy to terminate after implantation has occurred. 192 Up for debate was the intended (or potential) impact of personhood on hormonal contraceptives that are used by many women in the United States.
193
The revised language does nothing to clarify the stance of personhood proponents when it comes to hormonal contraception. 194 Eliminating the word fertilization from the definition of "person" does not address the issue nor does inclusion of the statement that only birth control that "kills a person" is prohibited. When pressed, Keith Mason recently explained that he is "not opposed to contraception," just "methods that "kill a living human being." 195 But that is precisely the concern associated with hormonal contraceptives, which are effective by using the same mechanisms of operation utilized in what personhood proponents find clearly problematic emergency contraceptives like Plan B.
196
Just briefly, hormonal contraceptives (including emergency contraception) 197 have been thought to utilize multiple mechanisms of operation to prevent pregnancy: 190 197 There are different types of hormonal contraception and emergency contraception. The most common types of hormonal contraception are combined pills ("COCs," which contain both estrogen and progesterone), and progesterone-only pills (POPs). (1) preventing ovulation as an initial matter by suppressing pituitary gonadotropin secretion, which is the mechanism operative most of the time; (2) altering cervical mucus to limit sperm penetration; (3) altering the endometrium (uterine lining) and fallopian tube to impede sperm travel; and (4) altering the endometrium rendering it inhospitable to successful implantation. 198 A woman who avoids pregnancy by taking hormonal contraception will not know which of these mechanisms worked.
199
The pill (morning-after or standard) may have failed to prevent ovulation and failed to prevent the sperm from penetrating the egg, but nonetheless succeeded in preventing the fertilized ovum from implanting, which would lead to the death of this newly recognized person. 200 Importantly, the true post-fertilization impact of hormonal contraceptives, including emergency contraceptives, is still hotly debated. 201 To the extent these methods are found to be only effective prior to the sperm penetrating the egg, personhood ought to have no impact on the permissibility of such contraceptives. But assuming that these methods can be effective in preventing successful pregnancy post-fertilization (by preventing intrauterine implantation and/or causing a miscarriage), perhaps the most forthright response regarding personhood's intended impact comes from Bill Fortenberry, a prominent personhood advocate in Alabama.
202
In his article Personhood and the Pill, Fortenberry wrote that to the extent hormonal contraception has an abortifacient effect, it would be banned by a personhood amendment. 203 He discussed research addressing whether hormonal contraception has such an effect, including one study that showed that twenty-one out of twenty-five women who became pregnant while on an oral hormonal contraceptive subsequently miscarried, which is twice the miscarriage rate for women not on the pill. . 199 Id. 200 Will, Measure 26, supra note 81, at 69. Dr. Larimore notes that POPs and Norplant (a subcutaneously implanted progesterone rod) are more likely to be effective post -fertilization than COCs. Larimore, supra note 197. Indeed, some opponents to the "hostile endometrium theory" argue that the level of progesterone in COCs is too low to have the post-fertilization impact suggested, particularly given the changed hormonal environment that would exist if break -through ovulation should occur. Id. 201 See Spreng, supra note 164, at 223; Michelle Castillo, Investigation Reveals Morning-After Pill May Not Prevent Implantation, CBS NEWS (June 7, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504763_162-57448998-10391704/investigation-reveals-morning-after-pill-may-not-preventimplantation/. Drs. Larimore and Stanford, on the other hand, cite to studies showing that hormonal contraception can alter the endometrium in a fashion that decreases the likelihood of successful intrauterine implantation. Larimore & Stanford, supra note 198, at 128-29 (noting that hormonal contraceptives reduce the thickness of the endometrium, alter integrin expression, and also potentially increase the risk of extra-uterine implantation, such as ectopic pregnancies). Several studies have indicated that the risk of ectopic pregnancy is higher for women using POPs. Id. at 129. Dr. Larimore acknowledges, however, that there are opponents to the "hostile endometrium theory," and he admits that little direct evidence exists for the true post-fertilization impacts of hormonal contraception. Larimore, supra note 197. 202 See Bill Fortenberry, Personhood and the Pill, PERSONHOOD INITIATIVE, available at http://www.personhoodinitiative.com/personhood-and-the-pill.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2013). 203 Id. 204 Id. Note that this is different from the question of which mechanism of operation makes the birth control method effective in preventing pregnancy. Here we are talking about the failure of the birth control to prevent pregnancy (successful implantation), yet nonetheless causing a subsequent
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Given the increased likelihood demonstrated in the study for hormonal contraception to lead to miscarriage (and the death of a person), Fortenberry explicitly concluded that the "Personhood Initiative will continue to advocate for a ban of any form of birth control that can be proven to cause the deaths of innocent children."
205 While Mason can appear evasive when asked about contraception, Fortenberry's position is clearly consistent with the goal of the Personhood Movement to protect all innocent persons, where personhood is considered to attach within the first twenty-four hours after the sperm penetrates the egg. Following the loss in Mississippi, one personhood advocate who expressly believes that the personhood movement would outlaw any type birth control that permits the fertilization of the egg noted that, in voting down the amendment, some conservatives demonstrated that they "are not really so pro-life as [they] think."
206
The relationship between pre-embryonic personhood and contraception can also be seen in the debates surrounding conscience clause legislation in the healthcare context. 207 These laws permit service providers and institutions to deny providing medical services on the basis of conscientious objection, and suggest that certain forms of birth control could be at risk of significant regulation under a personhood framework, even if the legislation or amendments that pass do not specifically impose them.
208
At the federal level, in 2008 the Bush Administration pushed the Provider Conscience Regulation (PCR) in order to protect providers who refuse to perform certain actions based on conscience. 209 The PCR attempted to define abortion 210 "to include any action that prevents the implantation of a fertilized egg, effectively including the birth control pill, other hormonal contraceptives and the intrauterine device." 211 The Obama Administration rescinded most of the PCR in 2011, 212 but miscarriage. It is the increased risk of miscarriage that Fortenberry is identifying as being problematic. In other words, when the pill is successful (operating pre-fertilization), it may not be problematic under a personhood framework; however, it would still be problematic given the risk that the pill will fail to prevent pregnancy, yet nonetheless lead to miscarriage. Id. 205 Id. recently proposed federal legislation would have offered even broader protection for conscientious objection, 213 and individual states have also taken up this cause. 214 Although conscientious objection to abortion has long been protected by most states, by the mid-2000s, states increasingly began to acknowledge objections to the provision of emergency contraception. 215 Some states have expanded their conscientious objection protection in a way that would include any form of contraception. 216 The Guttmacher Institute reports that as of August 2012 there are fourteen states that allow some healthcare providers to refuse to provide contraception, and six states explicitly permit pharmacists to refuse to dispense contraceptives. 217 Mississippi was actually the first state to broadly permit pharmacists to deny the provision of contraceptives, 218 and more recently, Missouri attempted to pass a bill that would have permitted employers and insurance providers to deny coverage for contraceptives. 219 There are clearly those who find certain forms of contraception problematic, and conscience legislation serves to protect that individual (or institutional) belief. But properly understood, the adoption of a personhood framework could be viewed to represent a state-wide (at least majoritarian) acceptance of the principles upon which these birth control methods are condemned. 220 Given the stated goal of the Personhood Movement to recognize and protect pre-embryonic human life, 221 even if the measure itself did not immediately outlaw certain forms of birth control, if proponents seek to remain consistent with the position, it is entirely possible that they would push for their given state to regulate contraception more heavily in an effort to offer protection to these newly recognized persons.
There are personhood advocates who support an outright ban on certain forms of contraception as a means to protect pre-embryonic persons from those contraceptives that could potentially cause their death. position that these forms of contraception carry the risk of causing death to a person, it does not necessarily follow that these forms of birth control must be banned. After all, the Constitution is currently interpreted to permit capital punishment, so it cannot be said that human life must always be protected. 223 Perhaps to account for this, the revised personhood language only purports to protect "innocent" persons. 224 Even still, there are many activities that are perfectly permissible notwithstanding the fact that they involve a significant risk of loss of innocent human life. 225 For instance, in 2012 the United States Census Bureau reported statistics showing that nearly 34,000 people died in 2009 from motor vehicle accidents.
226
While adults can surely make an autonomous decision to assume this risk, the many children under the age of fifteen who died in accidents 227 did not make that choice. Because we permit adults to subject children to this known risk of loss of innocent human life, risk of loss of life alone does not seem sufficient to support an outright ban on an activity. By analogy, a parent driving her child hopes to arrive at her destination without having a car accident, though she is certainly aware of the risk that an accident will occur and that her child might die. Similarly, a woman using hormonal contraception may hope to avoid pregnancy without fertilization taking place, though she remains aware of the risk that pregnancy is avoided only after a person comes into existence and then dies when implantation fails or is disrupted. In either case, at the time the decision is made (to drive or use hormonal contraception), the woman does not know whether a death will result, and indeed, it would be very difficult to predict the likelihood that a death would result.
As a society, a decision has been made that it is acceptable for a certain number of lives to be lost (innocent or otherwise) in exchange for the convenience of motor vehicle transportation. Of course, the states regulate such transportation to make it as safe as possible. Few would question the convenience that comes with the ability to use contraception the question would be, at what cost? Rather than immediately imposing an outright ban on forms of contraception that create a risk of loss of preembryonic life, we ought to ask what level of risk is acceptable, and what level of regulation is necessary to achieve it. The Guttmacher Institute recently reported that when used properly, the pill prevents pregnancy over ninety-nine percent of the time; however, it is not clear what proportion of that ninety-nine percent involved the death of a pre-embryonic person. 228 This information would be relevant to properly make the assessment suggested here. 229 Regardless of the result of such an outlaw all forms of contraception, it is far less clear whether certain forms of contraception could be restricted given a state's (compelling?) interest in protecting pre-embryonic persons following adoption of a personhood framework. 227 The census data included a finding that 6.88 minors under the age of 15 died in vehicular accidents per 100,000 residents. Id. 228 See GUTTMACHER, supra note 193. 229 One could also argue that the high rate of natural miscarriage (leading to the death of preembryonic persons) should lead to restrictions on unprotected sex itself. But personhood proponents inquiry, it cannot be said to be fear mongering to discuss the potential impacts of pre-embryonic personhood on contraception, and the types of restrictions 230 that might follow if such a framework is adopted.
B. PERSONHOOD AND IN VITRO FERTILIZATION
Like contraception, debates surrounding Measure 26 in Mississippi revealed questions about whether passage of the amendment would outlaw IVF. As noted, the revised personhood language states that "only in vitro fertilization and assisted reproduction that kills a person" are affected. 231 But if proponents are serious about extending the rights of legal personhood to pre-embryos, then protecting these persons from serious injury should also be a priority. Given the inherent risks to preembryos associated with IVF, there should be real concern that significant restrictions would result from the passage of a personhood measure either from the amendment itself or from subsequent legislation. 232 Keith Mason has suggested that while personhood may not necessarily "ban" IVF, he would like to see it "reformed." 233 The question is how. If a personhood framework is established utilizing the revised language, it is not clear what aspects of IVF would be immediately problematic, or might be subject to future restriction. In one of the few cases to consider the status of pre-embryos created in the IVF process, the court in For the same reasons mentioned in the context of contraception, I am not convinced that adoption of a personhood framework would require IVF to be expressly outlawed. Nevertheless, several of the procedures that are available within the process, such as pre-embryo selection, cryopreservation, pre-implantation genetic screening (PGS), and even the transfer process itself, pose significant risk of injury or destruction to the pre-embryos involved. 236 The following section will do not appear to be arguing for such restrictions, and the idea of the government regulating sexual activity itself (as opposed to the types of contraception or ART available) raises a host of constitutional problems that are beyond the scope of this project. discuss the risks associated with these procedures, and the types of restrictions on the practice of IVF that might be expected under a personhood framework. 237 Even without an outright ban on IVF, such restrictions could be stringent enough to make it effectively impossible for these reproductive services to be provided.
Pre-Embryo Creation, Selection, and Cryopreservation
In order for pre-embryos to be created, the male and female gametes (sperm and ova) must be retrieved. 238 The process for obtaining ova (or oocytes) is significantly more "onerous, painful, and risky than acquiring sperm," 239 and it is also very expensive. 240 The woman from whom ova will be retrieved must undergo daily injections of hormones to stimulate her ovaries to produce mature oocytes, which are then extracted laparoscopically using a needle guided by ultrasound.
241 Clinicians attempt to retrieve as many ova as possible, not just because of the cost and burden of the retrieval process, but also to increase the chances of successful fertilization and development. 242 In addition, clinicians will typically attempt to fertilize each of the ova retrieved, due to the low success rate historically associated with the cryopreservation of unfertilized ova.
243
During the first forty hours following introduction of the sperm to the ovum, an inspection is performed to determine whether cellular division has commenced.
244
Clinicians visually inspect the form and structure (morphology) of the pre-embryos in order to select those of the highest quality 245 for immediate use in implantation.
246
The "least robust" pre-embryos identified through this visual inspection are typically discarded, and sufficiently robust, though perhaps not the best pre-embryos that exceed the number to be immediately implanted are commonly cryopreserved. , 2004) , http://www.ivf.net/ivf/embryo-freezing-is-it-safe-o335.html (noting that the "best" pre-embryos are selected for fresh IVF cycles, as opposed to cryopreserving the best pre -embryos). Even where successful pregnancy and birth is achieved through IVF, because of a lack of studies (and the fact that symptoms may not appear for years), it is not well understood whether potential genetic abnormalities or defects may be caused by the IVF process. Under a personhood framework the visual inspection and discarding of pre-embryos could be problematic, as could cryopreservation. If personhood attaches within the first twenty-four hours after the sperm penetrates the egg, then a person would exist at the time the visual inspection is made. Proponents may seek to impose restrictions on the techniques and protocol used by clinicians to determine whether a given pre-embryonic person is fit for implantation. For instance, it is possible that cellular division fails to initiate or that otherwise very little development occurs after the sperm penetrates the egg. 248 In this situation personhood proponents might agree that the pre-embryonic person is not alive (or no longer alive?), 249 though they may still call for compassionate treatment 250 of this deceased person. On the other hand, cellular division may begin, but the morphology of the preembryo may suggest that development is abnormal and unlikely to result in successful implantation or pregnancy. Given the stated goal of protecting all life, without exception, 251 proponents would likely be uncomfortable with clinicians discarding living, though abnormal, pre-embryonic persons based on visual inspection. Under a personhood framework, it could be mandated that these preembryos either be transferred into the woman (and thus, at least given a chance at continued development, 252 as opposed to the certain death that discarding would bring), or that they be cryopreserved. 253 While cryopreservation offers many benefits, it also presents its own problems.
254
Cryopreservation is a routine part of the IVF process, 255 and it typically takes place when the pre-embryo is in the four-to eight-cell stage. 256 The existence of cryopreservation as an available option reduces the number of egg extractions a woman must undergo, and allows clinicians to transfer a smaller number of pre- 248 See Fuselier, supra note 236, at 144. 249 The awkwardness of using the language of "life" and "person" in this context highlights the deficiencies associated with ignoring the biological realities of the early reproductive process previously discussed. Under Louisiana law pre-embryos are recognized as juridical persons; however, if the fertilized ovum fails to develop (other than due to cryopreservation), it is considered nonviable, and not a juridical person. LA REV. STAT. ANN. 250 Even a national infertility organization that opposes personhood initiatives advises those undergoing IVF to inquire as to the options available for any pre-embryos (unfit or otherwise) not transferred to the woman's uterus. One option listed is a "disposal ceremony," designed to create "a special moment to come to closure regarding the [pre-]embryos." After IVF: The Embryo Decision, RESOLVE: NAT'L INFERTILITY ASS'N (2013), http://www.resolve.org/family-building-options/donoroptions/after-ivf-the-embryo-decision.html.
251 About Personhood, supra note 31. 252 We might question whether attempted implantation would be appropriate in these circumstances. Under a personhood framework, this abnormal pre-embryo would possess the same legal and moral status as you or I do. If clinicians determine that this pre-embryo has a very low probability of surviving the implantation process, then what justi fication would there be for sending this person we are trying to protect off to near certain death? Would it not be better to cryopreserve the pre-embryo in the hopes that one day technology would improve the odds of successful implantation and pregnancy? See infra notes 339-52 and accompanying text for further discussion of the risks associated with the transfer process. 253 embryos into a woman in a given cycle (thereby reducing the risk of multiple births), because excess pre-embryos can be saved for later use. 257 But the cryopreservation process also presents risk of injury or destruction to the pre-embryonic persons involved, which stems from the freezing and thawing processes, as well as the state and duration of being frozen. 258 In order to survive the freezing process, pre-embryos must "withstand potentially lethal ice formation, transmembrane water movement and extreme changes in external electrolyte concentrations, temperature and pH." 259 Then they must survive the reversal of these conditions associated with the thawing process.
260
While it is theoretically possible to keep pre-embryos frozen indefinitely, it is unclear whether, after a certain period of time, the pre-embryos become unsuitable for implantation. 261 In 2010 there was a successful birth resulting from the use of a pre-embryo that had been frozen for nearly twenty years; though it is worth noting that there were originally five such pre-embryos: only two survived the thawing process and were implanted, and only one resulted in a live birth. 262 In other words, eighty percent of the pre-embryonic persons involved died in the process, which may not be considered a success story.
The survival rates for cryopreserved pre-embryos vary from clinic to clinic with anywhere from 20-40% not surviving the freezing and thawing process. 263 In addition, at least some studies have shown that successful pregnancies are less likely to occur when using thawed as opposed to fresh pre-embryos, 264 and unsuccessful implantation obviously leads to the death of the pre-embryonic person involved. Further, the risks associated with cryopreservation are not limited to survival of the pre-embryo or suitability for implantation. 265 We are only just beginning to study the question of whether freezing can cause genetic modification and/or defects, some of which may not be expressed until years after birth.
266
This data would clearly be relevant in assessing whether cryopreservation poses an unacceptable risk of death or injury to pre-embryonic persons. In the meantime, knowledge of these risks could very realistically lead to restrictions on the use of cryopreservation under a personhood framework. After all, once we've identified a pre-embryonic person, decisions made (or regulations imposed) regarding that 257 Fuselier, supra note 236, at 147. 258 Id. 259 Wood, supra note 246. 260 Id. 261 Whether cryopreserved persons are "alive" as opposed to being in some sort of limbo, or whether they are (or ought to be) entitled to the same legal rights and protections as "thawed" persons are also interesting questions. 262 person including whether it is permissible to subject the person to cryopreservation 267 can fairly be scrutinized using a best interests standard.
268
While this is certainly true with respect to activities potentially resulting in the death of these persons who would have a constitutionally protected right to life, it can be more complicated when discussing the permissibility of genetic interventions that might be said to harm the pre-embryonic persons involved. The best interests standard seems appropriate, assuming (rightly or wrongly), as I believe personhood proponents would, that any genetic intervention that impacts pre-embryonic persons, though does not bring about death, would be identity-preserving. 269 In other words, that any genetic damage that might occur as a result of cryopreservation would not change the identity of the pre-embryonic person involved, and thus we can say that harm involved has occurred to a presently-existing (not future, as-yet unidentified) person. 270 As a result, it may be mandated that pre-embryos in a current state of cryopreservation remain frozen until the thawing technique becomes safer. Further, future cryopreservation of pre-embryonic persons could be outlawed entirely, with fertility clinics permitted to fertilize only those ova that will be immediately implanted. In Italy, cryopreservation of pre-embryos is expressly prohibited because "it constitutes an offence against the respect due to human beings . . . ."
271 Clinicians may fertilize no more than three ova in a given cycle, and each pre-embryo created must be transferred, regardless of its health status. 272 While not expressly outlawing cryopreservation, Germany's Embryo Protection Act makes it a crime to attempt to fertilize more ova than may be transferred in one cycle, and permits no more than three pre-embryos to be transferred.
273 267 This argument is equally applicable to any harm that might occur as a result of PGS, which is discussed below. 268 See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594 (Tenn. 1992) (noting that after the trial judge determined that the pre-embryos should be treated as "children in vitro," the judge "then invoked the doctrine of parens patriae and held that it was 'in the best interest of the children' to be born rather than destroyed"); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:131 (2012) (stating that "in disputes arising between any parties regarding the in vitro fertilized ovum, the judicial standard for resolving such disputes is to be in the best interests of the in vitro fertilized ovum"). 269 See infra note 299. 270 284 Success in this endeavor would also address the issue of women having to undergo multiple egg-extraction procedures where pre-embryo cryopreservation is prohibited.
Preimplantation Genetic Screening 285
Regardless of whether fresh or thawed pre-embryos are to be transferred, the participants in IVF increasingly choose to have PGS performed.
286 PGS requires the removal of one of the cells from a four-to eight-cell pre-embryo and testing it for certain genetic characteristics. 287 At the point when PGS is performed, each cell within the pre-embryo contains a fully-assembled, though inactive genome, and each cell is totipotent, with the capability of developing into a separate human being.
288
Because the extracted cell is destroyed in the testing process, if the cell itself is considered a separate person that would obviously seem problematic. 289 That said, PGS can be used to identify genetic abnormalities that would not have been caught through the visual inspection of the pre-embryos. 290 The most severe abnormalities are fatal, but under current practice, if PGS reveals any unwanted genetic characteristic (for instance, trisomy 21-Down syndrome) the preembryos would typically just be discarded or donated for research. 291 Clinics have also permitted the use of PGS for purposes of selecting pre-embryos for implantation that have certain desired traits such as a particular gender or those likely to develop into children with deafness or dwarfism. 292 And again, if infertility treatment ends before the supply of pre-embryos is exhausted, the unused pre-embryos (including those without the desired gender or those likely to develop into hearing children or children of normal height) are typically discarded or donated for research.
293
Discarding or donating pre-embryos for research would be problematic under a personhood framework that strives to protect human life regardless of disability or the existence of particular genetic traits. 283 Fuselier, supra note 236, at 147. 284 290 King, supra note 285, at 292. 291 Id. at 291. In addition to identifying chromosomal abnormalities, PGS can be used to screen for genetic markers associated with disorders such as Tay-Sachs and Huntington's, or for predispositions to certain cancers. Id. at 296. 292 Id. at 295-96. 293 Peters, supra note 174, at 217.
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Beyond this, the cell biopsy used to extract the cell to test for genetic characteristics creates the risk of causing damage to the pre-embryo that could render it unfit for implantation or otherwise lead to birth defects. 294 As Professor King has noted, the nature and extent of these risks are not well understood. 295 Logic might suggest that pre-embryos lacking genetic abnormalities have a higher probability of leading to successful pregnancy in a given IVF cycle, but certain studies have shown that pre-embryos implanted after PGS are less likely to result in pregnancy and birth. 296 More research is needed to determine whether the process of PGS itself is to blame for this increased IVF mortality rate for pre-embryonic persons. 297 Further, even if implantation and birth are successful, there is the possibility that removing a cell from the pre-embryo could cause developmental and other health problems later in life.
298 Knowingly exposing pre-embryonic persons to these as-yet unquantifiable risks of death or injury could be viewed as problematic under a personhood framework.
A significant problem with PGS has to do with the lack of benefit that such testing provides to the pre-embryonic person involved (notwithstanding the clear benefit to the prospective parents seeking the testing), especially when considering the risks inherent in the procedure. 299 We currently lack the technology to perform genetic modification or alteration to correct any genetic abnormality that might be discovered using PGS. 300 If the IVF patients planned to transfer the pre-embryos regardless of the PGS results, then perhaps the pre-embryo would benefit in the future to the extent the patients used this information to plan for raising a child with the identified condition. But this attenuated benefit would not seem to justify exposing the pre-embryos to the risks of death or injury identified here.
Beyond this type of utilitarian assessment, the President's Council on Bioethics noted that, particularly in the context of using PGS to identify a donor match for an 294 King, supra note 285, at 287. 295 Id. at 291-96, 303-08. 296 Id. at 292 n.37, 297. The study indicated a 37% live birth rate for IVF patients, decreasing to 25% for patients undergoing PGS. Id. at 287 n.16, 307.
297 Id. at 308. 298 Id. at 307 (noting that the extent of this risk is unknown since many of the children born after a PGS cycle are not yet through puberty). 299 For purposes of this paper I will bracket off the issue that some couples may only reproduce because of the availability of PGS, and therefore, PGS could be argued to provide the benefit of existence itself. This argument could be used by a patient only willing to pa rent a deaf child, which PGS makes possible through pre-embryo selection. In addition to the benefit, Parfit's Non-Identity Problem could be utilized to suggest that the decision to use PGS cannot be said to harm these resulting persons who are better off alive than not (at least assuming a life worth living). See PARFIT, supra note 270, at 358-61. But if the decision to use PGS is made after the pre-embryonic person is already in existence (for instance by a couple in the midst of using IVF), then the Non -Identity Problem would not appear to be implicated assuming we consider the genetic interventi on to be identity preserving, and it is therefore possible to assess whether PGS causes or creates a risk of harm to this identified person. already born sibling, PGS could also raise a Kantian 301 concern that such testing treats pre-embryonic persons as "a means for the benefit of another." 302 These issues become more apparent when considering that in the absence of PGS, all pre-embryos that pass visual inspection would likely be implanted or at least temporarily cryopreserved.
303
Leaving aside the eugenic implications of using PGS to select offspring with desired traits, 304 under a personhood framework, PGS would appear to be particularly susceptible to outlaw or severe restriction due to the risks involved and the questionable benefits to the pre-embryonic persons on whom testing is performed. 305 Although currently unregulated in the United States, 306 other countries offer examples of what such restrictions on PGS might look like. 307 Italy, Austria, and Switzerland have statutes that ban the practice of PGS altogether. 308 In addition, the Embryo Protection Act in Germany was historically interpreted to provide a blanket prohibition on PGS, 309 but a recent court decision 310 led to subsequent legislation that now permits PGS in the narrow circumstances where the parents have a high risk of passing on a serious genetic disease, or where the pre-embryo is suspected of carrying a defect that creates a high feasibility of miscarriage or stillbirth. 311 At the time, three bills were considered in Germany, one of which would have explicitly prohibited all PGS. 312 Those disfavoring any being carried by the intended mother or a gestational surrogate. 322 It is very unlikely that personhood proponents would treat selective reduction differently than any other procedure that terminates a fetus (or pre-embryo for that matter), 323 though keeping in mind the exceptions available considering the life and health of the woman experiencing a high-order multiple pregnancy. 324 Proponents also would be very cognizant of the risk that selective reduction could lead to termination of the entire pregnancy. 325 Even the American Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) acknowledges that high-order multiple pregnancies should be avoided due to the risks created for the women and fetuses involved. 326 In fact, Octomom 327 was identified as a primary reason behind the legislation proposing IVF restrictions in Georgia. 328 ASRM reported that "in 2000, more than two-thirds of all IVF transfer procedures in the United States were of three or more embryos." 329 While there are no laws currently governing the number of preembryos that may be transferred in a given IVF cycle in the United States, fertility organizations have offered guidelines calling for a reduced number. 330 For instance, today ASRM and the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART) recommend that for women under thirty-five, consideration should be given to implanting only one pre-embryo, and no more than two; though the guidelines still suggest that it is acceptable for up to five cleavage-stage pre-embryos (two or three days after fertilization) to be implanted in women over forty. 331 Further, data collected by the CDC suggest that, even in the absence of regulation, in the vast majority of IVF cycles no more than two or three pre-embryos are transferred per cycle, 332 and ASRM has documented a decrease in triplet gestation. 333 There is even some evidence to suggest that mandated insurance coverage for IVF could lead to reduced multiple-embryo transfers, because there would be less financial pressure to be successful in fewer attempts. 334 Nevertheless, if a personhood measure passes, restrictions on the number of pre-embryos that may be transferred in a given cycle are likely to follow to reduce the number of preembryonic persons put at risk. This is particularly true given that some recent studies seem to suggest that increasing the number of pre-embryos transferred does not necessarily increase the likelihood of achieving a successful pregnancy. 335 After a recent assessment of the literature on single-embryo transfer, ASRM determined that use of the procedure in the United States "has lagged behind that of many other countries," and that "IVF centers should promote [the procedure] when appropriate through provider and patient education." 336 Perhaps more controversially, the transfer of even a single pre-embryonic person during an IVF cycle could be considered problematic under a personhood framework. 337 No clinic boasts a 100% success rate and every failed implantation results in the death of a pre-embryonic person. While the Federal Government does not regulate the practice of IVF, the CDC does collect data from clinics on their success rates. 338 The CDC breaks down IVF success rates into a number of categories, such as: age of the woman, whether frozen or fresh pre-embryos were transferred (including the number of pre-embryos transferred in a given cycle), and whether donor eggs were used. 339 Nevertheless, it is difficult to ascertain the precise number of preembryos transferred that survive through birth, because multiple pre-embryos are often transferred, each pre-embryo could itself divide to become a multiple, and the CDC reports multiple-infant births as one live birth. For purposes here the point can be made by noting that in 2010 the CDC reported that only 36.5% of the fresh, nondonor pre-embryos that were transferred to women under the age of thirty-five actually implanted, with the percentage of implantation decreasing dramatically for
